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Introduction
"Is physical capital special? " Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) ask. Using the Ramsey approach (Ramsey, 1927) , they add human capital to an optimal taxation model with physical capital similar to that of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) . By modeling human capital almost symmetrically to physical capital they show that in a stationary state all taxes are zero. The Chamely and Judd's result is thus shown to extend to human capital. What drives this zero-tax result is that the human capital production function features constant returns to scale with respect to the stock of human capital. Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) call this specification a zero-profit condition. As a consequence, human capital disappears as an object of taxation in a competitive equilibrium. But they acknowledge that if the human capital production function violates the assumption of constant returns to scale, the stationary-state labor tax will not be zero. Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) raise an intriguing question and provide useful insights into the nature of optimal taxation, but in the end, unfortunately, no answer is evident. The difference between physical and human capital still is not clear, because they have made it disappear by means of zero-profit conditions. 1 This paper takes up the issue of modeling human capital almost symmetrically to physical capital. I drop the constant-returns-to-scale assumption. The human capital production function does not include the current stock of human capital, which therefore is not self-productive. It does not raise the productivity of human capital investments, or interchangeably, education. The increasing and concave production function only includes the household's time devoted to education. Time spent on education can-1 See also Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, pp. 534) for this line of argument.
4 not be substituted by physical goods. 2 Instead, the household has to pay for verifiable 3 direct costs, e.g.,s tuition fees, that depend on the amount of education. The government may choose to subsidize this cost. It therefore has two instruments at its disposal to guide education. Labor taxes and the subsidy both affect the opportunity cost of education. The next periods' labor tax rates affect the discounted stream of marginal earnings from education.
I derive two results: The first one is not surprising but nonetheless important, as it helps to clarify the role of zero capital taxation when the model features human capital. The other is new and shows how to deal with profits coming from education. First, optimal taxation in the stationary state prescribes not taxing capital income, as Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) show. The zero-capital-tax result holds despite the presence of human capital. Lucas (1990) , Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) and Chari and Kehoe (1999) also derive this result. The education decision depends only on how the labor tax and the education subsidy interact with each other. This relates to the second result, stating that in the optimum the marginal social return to education is larger than the marginal social cost.
The so-called Education Efficiency Theorem (Richter, 2009) , which states that the education decision is undistorted given certain assumptions, does not hold. From the inequality between the marginal social return and the marginal social cost it follows that education is effectively taxed, i.e., the private rate of return to education is smaller than the social rate of return.
Turning to the underlying tax rates, it results that the cost of education is not fully tax-deductible, the labor income tax rate is higher than the rate of subsidization. As a consequence, the household underinvests in human capital relative to the first best.
The second result is striking. Since the household is endowed with perfect foresight and therefore must be able to internalize the effects of its actions, one would have expected to derive an equality between the private and social rates of return to education, and the Education Efficiency Theorem to hold -a result that Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) , among others, 4 also obtain. Their zero-tax results imply that all private and social rates of return from investments in physical and human capital are equal in the stationary state. The difference in results is due to how I model the accumulation of human capital. The specification used gives rise to profits in equilibrium. Profits from education are not pure in the strict sense, because they still depend on raw labor supply. The government taxes away part of the return to education, thereby accepting the distortion of education.
To derive clear-cut results, the analysis is confined to an examination of the stationary state. In the stationary state, the household's decision variables remain constant. As usual, it is assumed that a unique stationary state exists and that the economy converges to it. It would be straightforward to introduce exogenous growth. To allow for a setting in which the economy grows endogenously is however not possible. The reason for this limitation is the specification of the human capital production function. Lucas (1988) and Caballe and Santos (1993) provide a discussion of the existence and properties of a balanced growth path. They show that the human capital production function must feature constant returns to scale with respect to the stock of human capital.
The Model

Household's Problem
The household solves the following maximization problem:
The household's utility function u is strictly increasing and concave in both arguments and continuously differentiable everywhere. The Inada conditions apply to ensure interior solutions. In each period t the household faces a consumption-labor-leisure choice. It consumes c t , which is not taxed, 5 and devotes n t time units to work in the labor market and e t time units to investment in human capital. The total time endowment is normalized to one, i.e., n t + e t + t = 1, where t is the amount of leisure. The household combines its raw labor supply n t with the current stock of human capital h t . The product z t ≡ n t h t is called the effective labor supply, 6 it earns the after-tax wage rate (1 − τ n t )w t where w t is the real wage rate. The household must spend resources (1 − τ e t ) f per time unit invested in human capital. One may think of f as tuition, books, and other related expenses. The government subsidizes this cost at rate τ e t . The household lends capital k t+1 to the firm. The rate of return net of taxes and deprecia-
where r t is the real interest rate and δ k is the rate at which capital depreciates. The household may lend b t+1 to the government which offers a rate of return of R b t+1 in the next period. In period 0, the household earns income from capital R k 0 k 0 and government debt R b 0 b 0 . (1) is the household's budget constraint in period t, which is associated with the Lagrange multipliers λ t .
Associated with the Lagrange multiplier μ t , the law of motion (2) describes the accumulation of human capital. Investments e t enter the human capital production function G, which is strictly increasing and concave, i.e., G < 0 < G . The crucial assumption is that the current stock of human capital does not enter the production function; it does not increase productivity. The output of G is added to the depreciated stock of human capital, the rate of depreciation being 0 < δ h ≤ 1. 7 Furthermore, the human capital production function G is assumed to be isoelastic, that is, γ ≡ G e/G < 1. 8 Finally, β is the household's discount factor, which, for simplicity, stays constant over time.
The first-order conditions are
Combine (7) and (8) to derive
(9) is a familiar condition that states that there is arbitrage-freeness between investments in physical capital and government bonds. Both investments promise the same rate of return in equilibrium.
Human capital can be regarded as an asset, similar to physical capital, that yields a rate of return, which in equilibrium must be equal to the other assets' rates of return. To see this, recursively eliminate μ t+1 in (6), and use (5) and (7) 9 :
The numerator in (10) summarizes the discounted sum of returns due to a marginal investment e t , henceforth referred to as the marginal (private) return to education. The investment in period t not only increases 9 Then the transversality condition
also emerges, which holds as long as 0 < δ h ≤ 1.
tomorrow's stock of human capital and thereby the wage earned, but also the stock afterwards at the decreasing rate 1 − δ h . 10 The denominator summarizes the marginal (private) cost of education in period t, comprising direct cost and foregone earnings. The optimality condition (10) reveals arbitrage-freeness between investments in human and physical capital.
(10) also shows that the depreciation rate δ h and the after-tax rate of return to physical capital investments R k affect the discounted present value of a time unit e t invested in human capital similarly. An increasing capital tax rate, which reduces R k , and an increasing rate of depreciation both raise the marginal return to education (Davies and Whalley, 1991) .
For further reference, the stationary state version of (10) is 11
(11) can be interpreted in the same way as (10). The household devotes time to education up to the point where the marginal cost equals the marginal return to education. One can also see that if the direct cost of education were 100% tax-deductible, i.e., τ n = τ e , the choice of education would be undistorted. Boskin (1975) was the first to state this insight.
(11) also reveals that capital taxation does not affect the marginal return to education, because only the household's discount factor β matters.
This means that only the labor tax rate τ n and the rate of subsidization τ e affect the wedge between the marginal return to and the marginal cost of education.
10 To allow for δ h = 1, 0 0 = 1 must hold. 11 Use 1 = βR k , which is the stationary state version of (7).
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Firm's problem
The representative firm produces the single consumption good using a neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale production function. It maximizes profits F(k t , n t h t ) − r t k t − w t n t h t in capital k t and effective labor z t ≡ n t h t , taking the capital rental rate r t and the wage rate w t as given . As a result,
The constant-returns-to-scale production technology implies that the firm makes zero profit in equilibrium.
Government's problem
The government finances an exogenously given stream of government ex-
. Its per-period budget constraint is
Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium consists of a feasible allocation
, and a government policy
such that, given the price system and the government policy, the allocation solves the household's and firm's problems, and the government balances its budget. C is the set of the competitive equilibria that result from different government policies. Put formally: (1), (2) and (14) hold for all t = 0, 1, . . . , k 0 , b 0 and h 0 are given.
Social Planner's Problem -First-Best Analysis
The social planner maximizes the household's utility subject to the resource constraint and the law of motion for human capital. The Lagrangian 
Analogously to the household's problem, the following condition shows how the social planner optimally chooses education 12 :
The numerator in ( For further reference, the stationary-state version of (20) reads
12 Recursively eliminate μ t+1 in (18), and use (16) and (19).
13
The efficiency condition (21) will serve as a benchmark when analyzing below how the education decision is affected by the use of distortionary taxation. The preceding discussion therefore suggests the following 
Ramsey Problem -Second-Best Analysis
Linear taxes are chosen to finance a given stream of government expenditures. The choice of taxes should maximize social welfare subject to resource and budget constraints and taking the household's and firm's competitive equilibrium behavior into account. Each government policy gives rise to a different competitive equilibrium. The Ramsey problem is to choose the competitive equilibrium that yields the highest utility. To solve the problem, the primal approach (Lucas and Stokey (1983) , Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) , Chari and Kehoe (1999) ) is adopted.
This approach is one way to take into account the competitive equilibrium behavior. Instead of choosing the optimal policy directly, which yields the optimal allocation and prices, one chooses the optimal allocation that is consistent with competitive equilibrium behavior and then solves for the government policy and prices that support this outcome. The key to solving this problem is to use the so-called implementability constraint that summarizes the household's competitive equilibrium behavior.
In the present model, three conditions on the Ramsey problem must hold. The first one, the implementability constraint, is the household's 14 budget constraint after having substituted for after-tax prices by means of the household's first-order conditions.
Combining the per-period budget constraints (1) leads to the intertemporal budget constraint (using (8)):
The transversality conditions (23) and (24) were positive, then the household could find an alternative allocation yielding a higher utility by simply consuming more in finite time. The reverse cannot hold either, because some other household has to be on the lending side and could increase utility for the reason just explained.
Then, using the household's first-order conditions (3) and (4) and thereby substituting out (1 − τ n t )w t h t , the intertemporal budget constraint (22) can be written as
which is the value of the initial endowment of physical capital and government bonds. (25) is the first constraint in the planner's problem.
The first-order conditions for e t and h t+1 , (5) and (6), which yield (10) and determine the dynamic choice of h t+1 , have not been used. Therefore, they give rise to a second constraint, which Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) and Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) call an Euler equation for the accumulation of human capital:
(1 − τ e t ) f could also be eliminated in (25) using (26). But dealing with the resulting double sum is cumbersome, which is why it is more convenient to work with two implementability constraints. In any case, either approach must yield the same solution. Pursuing the present way mixes the primal and the dual approach, as the planner has to optimize over the allocation and over the tax rate τ e t . Third, the economy's resource constraint is
The set R consists of all allocations that satisfy the three constraints above and the law of motion (2) for human capital. Put formally,
: (2), (25), (26) and (27) hold for all t = 0, 1, . . .
16
The Ramsey problem is to choose a member belonging to the set R that yields the highest utility.
The key result to solving the Ramsey problem is the following Proposition 1 (see Chari and Kehoe (1999) , Proposition 1). 
defining the so-called pseudo-welfare function, which includes the implementability constraint and also depends on the endogenous Lagrange multiplier φ. Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) follow the same approach. As k 0 is exogenous, τ k 0 works like a lump-sum tax. 14 To rule out this trivial form of taxation, it is common to assume τ k 0 = 0.
13 Even more obviously, this is the case in Chari and Kehoe (1999) , too. 14 To see this point, maximize the Lagrangian over τ k 0 :
φ measures the costs of using distortionary taxation. Optimally, τ k 0 should be chosen such that all government expenditures could be financed by taxing away the return to the initial stock of physical capital and thereby abstaining from levying distorting taxes on capital and labor. The other three factors are positive. Therefore, φ > 0. It is then possible to increase τ k 0 until φ = 0 and the present problem coincides with the first-best problem. This renders the whole analysis uninteresting. See also Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997, p. 111). Under the assumption that a unique stationary state exists, 15 the firstorder conditions for c t , e t , n t , h t+1 , k t+1 and τ e t , evaluated at the stationary state, are
The first-order conditions (28)- (33), the resource constraint (27), the implementability constraint (25), and the Euler equation (26) Proof. Combine (32) with (7) evaluated at the stationary state.
This is the seminal result by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) . Evidently, the private and social rates of return to capital investments are equal.
The zero-capital-tax result is independent of whether the model features human capital or not. From this follows that there is no trade-off between efficiency in physical and human capital formation. Proof. Multiply (35) by 1 − τ n , and combine the result with (11) using (13):
All the Lagrange multipliers are positive. Given that τ n < 1, the desired result follows.
The preceding results allow one to study how the social and the private return to education are related to each other. 
The first and second equalities follow from Proposition 2 and (11). (32) and Proposition 4 imply the inequality.
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The marginal social return is taxed at a higher rate than the marginal social cost. The result is that this tax scheme negatively distorts education incentives, as Proposition 4 clarifies.
To shed more light on the above results, consider the government's stationary-state budget constraint (14), which can be written as follows:
The direct cost of education is taxed at the rate (τ n − τ e ) as long as τ n > τ e . Suppose that the converse were true, and consider a marginal decrease of τ e . Then τ n has to decline as well if the government's budget constraint is to continue to hold. τ n ≤ τ e implies the private rate of return to education to be larger than the social rate of return. The considered tax reform has the effect that the marginal cost of education, consisting of the direct cost and forgone earnings, increases less than the marginal return. As a result, the private rate of return to education increases. Ceteris paribus, the household earns more income and hence consumption rises which increases utility. An efficiency gain would result, which is not possible, given that the planner maximizes efficiency.
Conclusion and Disussion
This paper explores the special nature of human capital compared to physical capital in an optimal taxation model. Capital income remains untaxed in the stationary state. The presence of human capital does not interfere with this result. This means taxing capital and human capital are two distinct issues and capital taxation is not a means to guide efficient education policy. This leaves labor taxation and the subsidization of the direct cost of 23 education as the only instruments to set efficient education incentives.
As the human capital production function includes time as the only production factor and not the current stock of human capital, the analysis calls for effective taxation of education, thereby partly extracting the ability rent. To achieve this end, the cost of education is not fully taxdeductible. As a consequence, the subsidy is insufficient in encouraging education and to offset the distortions caused by the tax on labor.
Critical is the assumption that the cost of education is fully observable.
This allows the government to use this piece of information to set an effective tax on education. Otherwise it has to resort to the labor tax alone to achieve this end, which would imply higher welfare costs. In reality it
is not that easy to get exact data on the time spent on education. Likewise it is not possible to precisely estimate the stock of human capital.
